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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________________ 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires us to construe the statute of 
frauds governing the sale of securities under Article 8 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") as enacted by New Jersey and 
North Carolina, the two jurisdictions relevant to this dispute. 
The question presented is whether the district court, pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), properly dismissed the 
claim of plaintiff ALA, Inc. ("ALA") that defendant CCAIR, Inc. 
("CCAIR") was in breach of an alleged agreement to sell ALA a 
controlling block of its common stock on the ground that the 
statute of frauds, § 8-319 of the U.C.C., N.J. Stat. Ann. §12A:8-
319; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-8-319, made the alleged agreement 
unenforceable. 
 ALA assigns two grounds of error.  First it argues that 
the district court erred in holding that a letter outlining the 
terms of the proposed deal that CCAIR's CEO Kenneth Gann sent to 
ALA's investment banker Larry Schatz was insufficient to satisfy 
§ 8-319(a) of the statute, which provides that the statute of 
frauds is satisfied if there is a "writing signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought . . . sufficient to indicate 
that a contract has been made for sale of a stated quantity of 
described securities at a defined or stated price."  ALA also 
submits that the district court's order dismissing the action was 
premature because § 8-319(d), which provides that the statute of 
frauds is satisfied if a party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in a "pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a 
contract was made," entitled it to an opportunity for discovery 
during which such an admission might be obtained, and hence 
precluded the granting of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
 Although we agree with the district court that the Gann 
letter does not sufficiently indicate that a contract had been 
made and thus that § 8-319(a) was not satisfied, we agree with 
ALA that § 8-319(d) of the statute prevents the district court 
from granting a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal here.  In order to give 
effect to § 8-319(d), ALA must have some opportunity to secure an 
admission from CCAIR.  We will therefore vacate the order of 
dismissal and remand the case to the district court with 
directions to grant ALA limited discovery to determine whether 
CCAIR will admit that an agreement was made.  We note that at the 
close of that limited discovery, the district court may again 
address the statute of frauds issue in a motion for summary 
judgment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 In late 1992 and early 1993, ALA, an investment firm 
based in New Jersey, became interested in making an investment in 
CCAIR, an airline based in North Carolina, which operates the 
commuter airline USAir Express.  In early January 1993, it 
instructed investment banker Larry Schatz (also an appellant in 
this case) to approach CCAIR and explore the possibility of a 
major stock transaction.  Schatz contacted the officers of CCAIR 
and told them that he had a client who was interested in 
purchasing a sizeable stake in the company.  The CCAIR officials 
expressed interest and a meeting was scheduled for January 18. On 
that date, Schatz, acting as the agent for ALA, met with upper 
level management of CCAIR, including a majority of the CCAIR 
Board of Directors, in North Carolina. 
 According to ALA's complaint, the two companies struck 
a deal at the meeting in which ALA agreed to buy and CCAIR agreed 
to sell approximately 3.5 million shares of authorized but 
unissued CCAIR stock for $3.15 per share or some lesser figure to 
be agreed upon by the parties.  Although the agreement reached at 
the meeting was oral, it was, ALA submits, memorialized by a 
letter Kenneth Gann, President and CEO of CCAIR, sent to Schatz 
on January 18, 1993 (the "Gann letter").  The Gann letter stated: 
Dear Mr. Schatz: 
 
 It was a pleasure meeting with you today and 
exploring with you the investment potential of CCAIR 
(the "Company"). 
 
 If your clients acquire the remaining 
approximately 3.5 million authorized but unissued 
common shares of the Company on or before ninety (90) 
days from the date hereof for $3.15 per share or such 
lesser amount [as] may be agreed by your client and the 
Company, we agree to pay you at the time of said share 
acquisition, an investment banking fee of $.15 per 
share. 
 
 In connection therewith, we will cause the 
appointment of two (2) nominees of your client to serve 
as board members of the Company for the remaining 
unexpired term of this current board. 
 
 Further, we agree to provide your client with such 
information as may be requested by your client in 
connection with the customary and permissible due 
diligence in a private place by a company whose 
securities are publicly traded. 
 
 The Company's agreement to complete this 
transaction is of course subject to our reasonable 
approval of your clients, the prior sale of the same 
securities and the requisite corporate approvals of 
both the Company and the purchasers. 
  
 If the foregoing accurately sets forth your 
understanding of the proposed transaction, please so 
indicate by executing and returning to me a copy of 
this letter. 
 
 Thank you. 
 
CCAIR, Inc. 
 
By:(s) Kenneth W. Gann 
   Kenneth W. Gann, 
   President 
 
Gann signed the letter, and Schatz agreed and accepted its terms 
by returning a signed copy. 
 Shortly after January 18, the parties took a number of 
steps to consummate the deal.  On January 25 they entered into a 
confidentiality agreement in which they agreed not to disclose 
confidential information exchanged between them.  On January 26, 
the representatives for each party met in New Jersey to discuss 
how financial and other confidential information would be 
exchanged, and they decided that further refinement of the 
transaction would be handled by counsel.  On February 3, counsel 
for ALA forwarded a term sheet to CCAIR outlining the terms for 
the purchase of CCAIR common stock.  It proposed that ALA acquire 
the stock at $2.65 per share. 
 On February 11, however, CCAIR abruptly terminated 
discussions with ALA and told ALA that it no longer wished to 
complete the transaction.  Although ALA tried to revive the 
negotiations by submitting a revised term sheet offering to 
purchase the securities for $3.15 per share, CCAIR was unmoved.0 
Once it became clear to ALA that it could not persuade CCAIR to 
close the deal, both ALA and Schatz sued CCAIR in federal 
district court in New Jersey for breach of the agreement 
allegedly reached on January 18.  ALA sought specific performance 
of the contract and Schatz sought a commission.0  
 Instead of answering the complaint, CCAIR filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).0  The district 
court granted the motion, holding that § 8-319 made the agreement 
alleged by ALA unenforceable.  
                                                           
0CCAIR apparently decided to terminate discussions because its 
publicly traded stock price shot up shortly after the meeting 
with Schatz on January 18.  Around January 26 CCAIR's stock was 
trading at $4.50.  By April 7, the time ALA filed its complaint, 
CCAIR's stock was trading at $9.00 per share. 
0Subject matter jurisdiction was based on diversity of 
citizenship.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  ALA is a Maryland 
corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey; 
Larry Schatz is a citizen of New York; and CCAIR is a Delaware 
corporation with its principal place of business in North 
Carolina. 
0The day after ALA filed its complaint, CCAIR had filed a lawsuit 
in North Carolina state court seeking a declaration that no 
contract existed.  ALA removed it to the federal district court 
for the Western District of North Carolina and then filed a 
motion to enjoin the proceeding, which CCAIR did not oppose. 
 Section 8-319, the statute of frauds for securities 
transactions, provides in pertinent part: 
A contract for the sale of securities is not 
enforceable by way of action or defense unless: 
 
(a) There is some writing signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought or by his 
authorized agent or broker, sufficient to indicate 
that a contract has been made for sale of a stated 
quantity of described securities at a defined or 
stated price; [or] 
 
.  .  . 
 
(d) The party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in 
court that a contract was made for the sale of a 
stated quantity of described securities at a 
defined or stated price.0 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:8-319.0  During the motion proceedings, ALA 
argued that the Gann letter was a writing sufficient to satisfy 
subsection (a) and that the language of subsection (d) made any 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion premature because it was possible for CCAIR 
to make admissions during the course of discovery that would 
allow ALA to satisfy the statute.   
 The district court rejected these contentions and 
granted the motion to dismiss.  The court held that the Gann 
                                                           
0ALA concedes that neither section (b) nor section (c) of the 
statute was satisfied, and they are not at issue. 
0Although it has not been resolved whether North Carolina or New 
Jersey law applies to this action, both states have adopted the 
same relevant language from Article 8 of the U.C.C., see N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 12A:8-319; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 25-8-319, and no 
conflict appears in the relevant case law.  Therefore, no choice 
of law analysis need be performed.  See Lucker, Unit of Amclyde 
Engineered Prods., Inc. v. The Home Ins. Co., Slip Op. No. 93-
1414, 8-9 (3d Cir. May 12, 1994).  For convenience only, 
citations will be to the New Jersey statute. 
 
letter did not satisfy § 8-319(a) because it did not constitute a 
contract for the sale of securities.  It rejected ALA's claim 
that § 8-319(d) made the dismissal premature because "taking into 
account the allegations in [the plaintiffs'] complaint and the 
exhibits attached thereto, it seems highly unlikely that 
plaintiffs could ever obtain this admission."0  ALA claims that 
both of these grounds for dismissal were erroneous.  Our review 
of the order granting the dismissal is plenary.0 
II. DISCUSSION 
A.  The Rule 12(b)(6) Standard 
   In considering whether a complaint should have been 
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, the court must consider only those facts alleged in the 
complaint and accept all of the allegations as true.  Hishon v. 
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984). 
Unless the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the 
claim that would entitle him to relief, the complaint should not 
be dismissed.  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 
99, 102 (1957); D.P. Enters., Inc. v. Bucks County Community 
College, 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984).  When reviewing a 
complaint, a court should consider not only the allegations 
contained in the complaint itself but also the exhibits attached 
                                                           
0Having concluded that there was no enforceable contract, the 
district court also concluded that Schatz was not entitled to a 
commission and dismissed his claim.  Because Schatz's claim for a 
commission rises or falls with ALA's claim, we will deal only 
with ALA's claim herein. 
0We have jurisdiction over this appeal from a final order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
to it which the complaint incorporates pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 10(c).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) ("A copy of 
any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a 
part thereof for all purposes."); cf. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. 
v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a court may also consider an "undisputedly 
authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a 
motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the 
document"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 687 (1994).0 
 Finally, a complaint may be subject to dismissal under 
Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense, like the statute of 
frauds, appears on its face.  Continental Collieries, Inc. v. 
Shober, 130 F.2d 631, 635 (3d Cir. 1942) ("where the defect [of 
the statute of frauds] appears on the face of the pleading, the 
question may be raised on motion to dismiss for insufficiency"); 
see 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1357, at 358-59 (1990) (citing cases).0  With these 
                                                           
0Where there is a disparity between a written instrument annexed 
to a pleading and an allegation in the pleading based thereon, 
the written instrument will control.  See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. 
v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206-07 (5th Cir. 1975). 
0In Currier v. Knapp, 442 F.2d 422 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam) we 
held that the statute of frauds defense could not be raised in a 
motion to dismiss.  Currier involved a motion to dismiss an 
action seeking specific performance of a realty contract on the 
ground that the complaint did not allege the existence of a 
writing necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds.  The panel 
held that the motion was improper because the statute of frauds 
defense was an affirmative defense that needed to be set forth in 
the answer, and the defendant had filed none.  Id. at 422-23.  To 
the extent Currier ignored Continental Collieries and held that 
the statute of frauds defense could never be raised on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss it is inconsistent with Continental 
Collieries and does not bind us.  See O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro 
standards in mind, we now consider each ground for the district 
court's dismissal. 
 
B. Section 8-319(a) and the Gann Letter 
 An oral agreement for the sale of securities is 
unenforceable unless the party seeking to enforce the agreement 
produces a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement 
is sought "sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made 
for sale of a stated quantity of securities at a defined or 
stated price."  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:8-319(a).  The writing need 
not be the contract itself, and it need not contain all of the 
terms of the agreement to satisfy § 8-319(a).  It must merely 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1017, 102 S. Ct. 1711 (1982) ("a panel of this court cannot 
overrule a prior panel precedent. . . .  To the extent that [the 
later case] is inconsistent with [the earlier case, the later 
case] must be deemed without effect."); Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. 
Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 781 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying O. 
Hommel). 
     The Continental Collieries rule appears to be the better 
approach at all events, for the weight of authority is that the 
statute of frauds defense can be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion.  It makes sense to allow an affirmative defense to be 
raised in a motion to dismiss "because of the obvious advantage 
of raising a potentially dispositive issue by preliminary motion 
instead of requiring a responsive pleading.  Moreover, plaintiff 
is not seriously prejudiced by having his complaint dismissed at 
a relatively early stage, since he generally will be permitted to 
amend his pleading if the defect can be cured."  5A Wright & 
Miller at § 1357, at 351.  Indeed, we have recognized that other 
affirmative defenses may properly be raised in a motion to 
dismiss.  See, e.g., Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 
1993) (affirming 12(b)(6) dismissal of complaint as being barred 
by statute of limitations).  By returning to the Continental 
Collieries rule we remove an anomaly in our jurisprudence. 
evidence the existence of the contract, state the quantity of 
securities agreed to be sold, and state the price.0 
 ALA argues that the Gann letter satisfies the writing 
requirement of § 8-319(a).  The language upon which ALA relies 
appears in the second paragraph of the letter:      
If your clients acquire the remaining approximately 3.5 
million authorized but unissued common shares of the 
Company on or before ninety (90) days from the date 
hereof for $3.15 per share or such lesser amount [as] 
may be agreed by your client and the Company, we agree 
to pay you at the time of said share acquisition, an 
investment banking fee of $.15 per share. 
This paragraph, ALA contends, contains both a stated quantity and 
a stated price and, since the letter is signed by Kenneth Gann, 
the letter satisfies the three critical terms of § 8-319(a). 
 CCAIR counters that this language in the Gann letter 
did not confirm the existence of a deal for a stated quantity and 
price.  In its submission, the letter, taken as a whole, merely 
                                                           
0The district court suggested in its opinion that in order to 
satisfy § 8-319(a) the Gann letter itself needed to constitute a 
written contract:  it framed the issue before the court as 
"whether the Gann letter constitutes a contract for the sale of 
the securities."  We do not believe that § 8-319(a) can be read 
in that way.  The language of the statute simply requires a 
writing "sufficient to indicate" that a contract has been made 
for a stated quantity of securities at a stated price.  A 
carefully prepared written contract would be sufficient, but it 
is not necessary.  See Konsuvo v. Netzke, 220 A.2d 424, 436 (N.J. 
Super. 1966) (suggesting that a letter or minutes of a meeting 
would be sufficient under appropriate circumstances (quoting 
N.J.S.A § 12A:8-319, New Jersey Study Comment note 6 ("It is no 
longer necessary to produce a memorandum.  The plaintiff merely 
has to produce a signed writing sufficient to 'indicate that a 
contract has been made' . . . .  The important elements which 
must appear in the signed writing are the quantity of described 
securities and a definable or stated price.") (internal quotation 
marks omitted))).  Thus the district court erred to the extent it 
held that the Gann letter did not satisfy the statute of frauds 
because it was not itself a contract.      
promised to pay Schatz a commission "if" the deal went through. 
At most, says CCAIR, the Gann letter revealed the existence of a 
proposed transaction contingent on future successful 
negotiations.  And writings that merely evidence the existence of 
negotiations, CCAIR argues, do not satisfy § 8-319(a).  We agree. 
 Although there are no New Jersey cases on point, all of 
the case law interpreting § 8-319(a), including case law from 
North Carolina, has held that writings that merely evidence that 
the parties were negotiating a contract are insufficient to 
satisfy § 8-319(a).  See Oakley v. Little, 272 S.E.2d 370, 373 
(N.C. App. 1980) ("Where writings only represent negotiations for 
agreements to be made in the future the courts have held under 
U.C.C. § 2-201 that they were not binding contracts. . . . 
[P]laintiff's exhibits are insufficient to show a contract for 
the sale of the stock [under § 8-319(a)], because they merely 
represent tentative negotiations." (citations omitted)); Cramer 
v. Devon Group, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 176, 182-183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(holding that letters showing the parties were negotiating a 
purchase of shares were insufficient to satisfy § 8-319(a)); 
Anderson Chem. Co. v. Portals Water Treatment, 768 F. Supp. 1568, 
1577-78 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (holding that an extremely detailed 
letter of intent contemplating subsequent definitive purchase and 
merger agreements was insufficient to satisfy § 8-319(a)), aff'd 
in part and rev'd in part without op., 971 F.2d 756 (11th Cir. 
1992); cf. Conaway v. 20th Century Corp., 420 A.2d 405, 412-413 
(Pa. 1980) (holding that writings which merely show a plan, a 
proposal, or an offer which looked to some future relationship 
but which do not evidence an existing contract are insufficient 
to satisfy U.C.C. § 2-201) (citing cases).0 
 Thus, although ALA correctly argues that the Gann 
letter need not contain all of the terms of the contract, it must 
at least establish the existence of a contract.  This it does not 
do.  The language of the letter does no more than reference past 
negotiations and contemplate a proposed transaction.  The price 
term in the letter is fluid.  Moreover, the letter states that 
the completion of the "proposed transaction" was "subject to our 
reasonable approval of your clients, the prior sale of the same 
securities and the requisite corporate approvals."  In our view, 
a fair reading of the letter shows that it was simply a 
confirmation on the part of Gann that CCAIR would pay Schatz a 
commission if the deal went through.0 
                                                           
0As CCAIR points out, the New Jersey courts have held, in 
interpreting other uniform laws, that the opinions of sister 
states "are of signal import, and [the New Jersey courts] are 
more or less imperatively obliged to recognize their value as a 
guiding precedent."  State v. Weissman, 179 A.2d 748, 752 (N.J. 
Super.) (interpreting Uniform Narcotic Drug Law), certif. denied, 
181 A.2d 782 (N.J. 1962); see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:1-102(2)(c) 
("Underlying purposes and policies of this act are . . . (c) to 
make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."). 
 
0We note, however, that although the proffered writing is not 
adequate to satisfy the statute of frauds and, by itself, leaves 
doubt that an agreement was reached at all, it is by no means 
clear that an agreement was not reached at the North Carolina 
meeting.  The letter shows that the parties discussed in detail 
the most critical terms of the proposed transaction (price and 
quantity) and the subsequent actions of the parties were focussed 
on details of completing the transaction.  Thus, as is discussed 
below, the district court prematurely concluded it unlikely that 
an admission from CCAIR would be forthcoming. 
 At all events, the Gann letter leaves considerable 
doubt as to whether there was any agreement at all.  And "'if the 
proffered writings permit doubt as to the existence or nature of 
the contractual relationship, the inquiry is terminated and the 
agreement deemed unenforceable.'"  Cramer, 774 F. Supp. at 183 
(quoting Horn & Hardast Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 888 F.2d 8, 11 (2d 
Cir. 1989)).  Therefore the letter does not satisfy § 8-319(a) 
and hence we turn to the question whether § 8-319(d) precludes a 
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.  
 
C. Section 8-319(d) and Rule 12(b)(6) 
 Section 8-319(d) of the U.C.C. provides that an oral 
contract for the sale of securities is enforceable by way of 
action or defense if "the party against whom enforcement is 
sought admits in his pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court 
that a contract was made for the sale of a stated quantity of 
described securities at a defined or stated price."  See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 12A:8-319(d).  According to ALA, § 8-319(d) gives a 
plaintiff the right to ask the defendant to admit the fact that 
an oral contract was made, and thus precludes the granting of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion on statute of frauds grounds in most cases 
because to do so would deprive the plaintiff of any opportunity 
to get such an admission.  We agree.        
 The purpose of the statute of frauds in the U.C.C. is 
evidentiary -- to protect people from fraudulent claims that a 
contract did or did not exist.0  See 2 William Hawkland, Uniform 
Commercial Code Series § 2-201:01 (1992) ("The purpose of the 
statute of frauds is to protect people against misunderstanding 
and fraud arising out of alleged oral contracts."); 7 id. at § 8-
319:01 (stating that § 8-319 mirrors §2-201 and that cases 
interpreting § 2-201 should also apply to cases involving § 8-
319).0  Section 8-319(d) is an important component of this 
                                                           
0
 We recognize that an alternative justification often given for 
the statute of frauds is that it performs a cautionary and 
channeling function.  See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth 
on Contracts § 6.1, at p. 85 (1990) (noting that the most durable 
and well-regarded of the statute of frauds' provisions perform 
important cautionary and channeling functions).  In other words, 
the statute may principally operate to ensure that in certain 
circumstances, a person who enters into an agreement hastily will 
not be bound until that person soundly decides, through the 
formal act of signing his or her name to a paper containing a 
quantity and price, that he or she will be bound by the 
agreement.  Under such a view, whether the defendant did or did 
not enter into an oral agreement is irrelevant.  All that matters 
is that the person sought to be charged has, after careful 
reflection, decided that he or she will be bound and is 
signalling that to the world. 
 But the cautionary and channeling justification does 
not appear to be what is driving § 8-319, since such a 
justification does not square with § 8-319(d).  To begin with, if 
the cautionary and channeling function were the principal one, 
§8-319(d) would be unnecessary since a party deciding to be bound 
by an oral contract could simply waive the statute of frauds 
defense at any time in the litigation.  In addition, admissions 
during the course of a litigation would appear to serve only a 
negligible cautionary or channeling purpose.  Since answers given 
in discovery must be truthful, a defendant must admit to the 
existence of a contract regardless of whether he or she intends 
to be bound.   
0Consistent with this general evidentiary function, § 8-319 makes 
oral agreements enforceable not only where there is a writing, 
but also where there is evidence that is just as good as a 
writing, such as when there is delivery or payment of the stock, 
or written confirmation.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:8-319(b) 
(delivery or payment has been made) and N.J. Stat. Ann. §12A:8-
319(c) (written confirmation). 
general policy since judicial admissions are good evidence that 
an agreement had been made.  And § 8-319(d) shows that the 
drafters of the U.C.C. recognized that fraud can work in both 
directions: while § 8-319(a) protects defendants against 
fraudulent claims that a contract has been made, § 8-319(d) 
protects plaintiffs from fraudulent claims that a contract has 
not been made. 
 In order for § 8-319(d) to function, the plaintiff must 
have some opportunity to obtain an admission from the defendant. 
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, would derail the plaintiff's 
case pre-pleading and allow the defendant to defeat a cause of 
action on an oral contract before the plaintiff has any 
opportunity to seek an admission that a contract existed. 
Allowing a defendant to dispose of a case on a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion would eviscerate § 8-319(d) and potentially allow a 
defendant to avoid the obligations of an oral contract into which 
he or she actually entered.0 
 Thus many courts have concluded that motions to dismiss 
based on the statute of frauds are improper.   See Weiss v. 
Wolin, 303 N.Y.S.2d 940, 943-44 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (explaining that 
                                                           
0In addition, "[t]here is no justification for dismissing a 
complaint for insufficiency of statement, except where it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief 
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the 
claim.  No matter how likely it may seem that the pleader will be 
unable to prove his case, he is entitled, upon averring a claim, 
to an opportunity to try to prove it."  Continental Collieries, 
130 F.2d at 635 (citation omitted).  Given the language of § 8-
319(d), the allegation here that an agreement was reached raises 
the possibility that the defendant will admit to it and so it is 
possible that the statute of frauds will be satisfied. 
to sustain a demurrer under § 8-319 would deprive the plaintiff 
of an opportunity to get the defendant to admit "in his 
pleadings, testimony or otherwise" that a contract was made); 
Garrison v. Piatt, 147 S.E.2d 374, 375-76 (Ga. App. 1966) 
("[Section 8-319(d)] was designed to prevent the statute of 
frauds itself from becoming an aid to fraud, by prohibiting one 
claiming the benefit of the statute who admits in the case the 
oral contract sued upon."); cf. Lewis v. Hughes, 346 A.2d 231, 
236 & n.10 (Md. 1975) (rejecting a demurrer based on § 2-201); M 
& W Farm Serv. Co. v. Callison, 285 N.W.2d 271 (Iowa 1979) 
(same); Duffee v. Judson, 380 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 1977) 
(same); Dangerfield v. Markel, 222 N.W.2d 373, 378 (N.D. 1974) 
(same); see also Boylan v. G.L. Morrow Co., 468 N.E.2d 681, 688 
(N.Y. 1984) (Meyer, J., dissenting) ("[I]f a defendant could 
prevail simply by raising the Statute of Frauds in a prepleading 
motion to dismiss, the admission exception would be vacuous.  The 
defendant never would have to face the choice of admitting or 
denying the contract . . . . [T]he provision is designed to 
discourage fraudulent claims and not to caution against the 
making of unwise and ill-considered promises." (internal citation 
and quotations omitted)); 2 Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code 
Series at § 2-201:06 n.2 (stating that a motion to dismiss is 
improper unless the plaintiff is given a full opportunity to 
elicit an admission in pretrial discovery proceedings). 
 These cases (and the Hawkland treatise) are persuasive, 
and we believe that New Jersey and North Carolina would find them 
so.  We therefore hold that the district court should have given 
ALA an opportunity to elicit an admission from CCAIR before 
dismissing the lawsuit.  Because ALA was given no such 
opportunity, the dismissal of the lawsuit was premature and must 
be set aside.  We recognize that our construction of the statute 
essentially means that U.C.C. § 8-319 will rarely provide the 
means for a motion to dismiss.0  However, for the reasons we have 
stated, we believe that such a result is contemplated by the 
statute and is, in fact, reasonable. 
 We also do not think our holding will significantly 
increase the costs of litigation.  The purposes of § 8-319(d) 
will be served if the district court grants to the plaintiff 
enough time to engage in a limited program of discovery with a 
view to permitting the plaintiff a fair opportunity to procure an 
admission.  The court could then consider in fairly short order a 
motion for summary judgment.  What is important is that the 
plaintiff be given some chance to obtain an admission from the 
defendants.0 
                                                           
0We do not rule out the possibility that in some cases the 
pleadings would exclude the possibility of admission, but that is 
not the case here. 
0
 We acknowledge that the language in section 8-319(d) might lead 
one to the conclusion that, under our approach, even summary 
judgment would not be appropriate (since theoretically a witness 
could admit at trial that there was a contract).  It should not. 
It is well accepted that a district court may grant summary 
judgment where there is a statute of frauds defense under Article 
8.  See, e.g., Katz v. Abrams, 549 F. Supp. 668, 672 (E.D. Pa. 
1982) (holding that where the defendant denies making a contract 
in depositions, plaintiff is not entitled to a trial on the issue 
otherwise barred by § 8-319); see also, 7 Hawkland, Uniform 
Commercial Code Series § 8-319:07 ("[I]n those cases where the 
defendant has already specifically denied the plaintiff's factual 
allegations as, for example, in his answer or in a deposition, a 
 The order of the district court granting the motion to 
dismiss will be vacated and the case remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  The 
parties shall bear their own costs.  
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court should feel free to determine that a trial would serve no 
purpose because of the unlikelihood of eliciting an admission."). 
 A motion for summary judgment is different in critical 
respects from a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
In addition to the fact that a plaintiff presumably has had an 
opportunity to obtain admissions during discovery, a motion for 
summary judgment is reviewed under a much more stringent standard 
than a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Thus, 
where the papers filed as part of the summary judgment motion 
show that there is no issue of material fact concerning the 
existence of a contract, the contention that a trial should go 
forward because there might be an admission at trial would be 
merely speculative and as such insufficient to avoid summary 
judgment.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986). 
